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Michael Tonry and Mary Lynch
Intermediate Sanctions
ABSTRACT
Most American jurisdictions have recently established new intermediate
sanctions programs. Few such programs have diverted large numbers of
offenders from prison, saved public monies or prison beds, or reduced
recidivism rates. These findings recur in evaluations of community
service, intensive supervision, house arrest, day reporting centers, and
boot camps. The principal problems have been high rates of revocation
and subsequent incarceration (often 40-50 percent) and assignment of less
serious offenders than program developers contemplated. If intermediate
sanctions are to achieve their aims, means must be found to assure that
they are used for the kinds of offenders for whom they are designed.
Three major developments in the 1960s and 1970s led to the perceived
need in the 1980s and 1990s to develop intermediate sanctions that fall
between prison and probation in their severity and intrusiveness. First,
initially on the basis of doubts about the ethical justification of rehabili-
tative correctional programs (Allen 1964), and later on the basis of
doubts about their effectiveness (Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks 1975;
Brody 1976; Sechrest, White, and Brown 1979), rehabilitation lost
credibility as a basis for sentencing. With it went the primary rationale
for individualized sentences.
Second, initially in academic circles (e.g., Morris 1974; von Hirsch
1976) and later in the minds of many practitioners and policy makers,
"just deserts" entered the penal lexicon, filled the void left by rehabili-
tation, and became seen as the primary rationale for sentencing. With
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it came a logic of punishments scaled in their severity so as to be
proportionate to the seriousness of crimes committed and a movement
to narrow officials' discretion by eliminating parole release, eliminating
or limiting time off for good behavior, and constraining judges' discre-
tion by use of sentencing guidelines and mandatory penalties.
Third, beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, crime
control policy became a staple issue in election campaigns, and propo-
nents of "law and order" persistently called for harsher penalties. With
this came a widespread belief that most sentences to ordinary probation
are insufficiently punitive and substantial political pressure for in-
creases in the severity of punishments. Because, however, most states
lack sanctions other than prison that are widely seen as meaningful,
credible, and punitive, pressure for increased severity has been satisfied
mostly by increases in the use of imprisonment.
These developments resulted in a quadrupling in the number of state
and federal prisoners between 1975 (240,593) and 1993 (948,881) and
in substantial overcrowding of American prisons. At year end 1993,
the federal prisons were operating at 136 percent of rated capacity,
and thirty-nine state systems were operating above rated capacity. An
additional 51,000 state prisoners in twenty-two jurisdictions were be-
ing held in county jails because prison space was unavailable (Bureau
of Justice Statistics 1994).
Whatever the political and policy goals that vastly increased numbers
of prisoners may have satisfied, they have also posed substantial prob-
lems for state officials. Prisons cost a great deal to build and to operate,
and these costs have not been lightly borne by hard-pressed state bud-
gets in the recessionary years of the early 1990s. In 1994, corrections
budgets were the fastest rising component of state spending (National
Conference of State Legislatures 1993). However, failure to deal with
overcrowding attracts the attention of the federal courts, and through-
out the 1990s as many as forty states have been subject to federal court
orders related to overcrowding.
Intermediate sanctions have been seen as a way both to reduce the
need for prison beds and to provide a continuum of sanctions that
satisfies the just deserts concern for proportionality in punishment.
During the mid-1980s, intermediate sanctions such as intensive super-
vision, house arrest, and electronic monitoring were oversold as being
able simultaneously to divert offenders from incarceration, reduce re-
cidivism rates, and save money while providing credible punishments
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that could be scaled in intensity to be proportionate to the severity of
the offender's crime. Like most propositions that seem too good to be
true, this one was not true.
During the past decade's experimentation, we have learned that
some well-run programs can achieve some of their goals, that some
conventional goals are incompatible, and that the availability of new
sanctions presents almost irresistible temptations to judges and correc-
tions officials to use them for offenders other than those for whom the
program was created.
The goals of diverting offenders from prison and providing tough,
rigorously enforced sanctions in the community have proven largely
incompatible. A major problem, and it has repeatedly been shown to
characterize intensive supervision programs, is that close surveillance
of offenders reveals higher levels of technical violations than are discov-
ered in less intensive sanctions. Revocations for conduct constituting
new crimes are seldom higher for offenders in evaluated programs than
for comparable offenders in other programs. Nor is there reason to
suppose that offenders in evaluated new programs commit technical
violations at higher rates. But if they do breach a curfew or stop per-
forming community service or get drunk or violate a no-drug-use con-
dition, the closer monitoring to which they are subject makes the
chances of discovery high; once the discovery is made, many program
operators believe they must take punitive action-typically revocation
and resentencing to prison-to maintain the program's credibility in
the eyes of judges, the media, and the community.
A second major lesson is that elected officials and practitioners often
prefer to use intermediate sanctions for types of offenders other than
those for whom programs were designed. Many evaluations of inten-
sive supervision programs and boot camps, for example, have shown
that any realistic prospects of saving money or prison beds require that
they be used mostly for offenders who otherwise would have served
prison terms. Yet many elected officials and practitioners resist.
Elected officials resist because they are risk averse. Even in the best-
run programs, offenders sometimes commit serious new crimes, and
officials are understandably concerned that they will be held responsi-
ble for supporting the program. The Massachusetts furlough program
for prisoners serving life sentences from which Willy Horton ab-
sconded, for example, had been in operation for fifteen years and was
started under a Republican governor in 1971, but Democratic governor
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Michael Dukakis was held politically accountable for Horton's 1986
rape of a Maryland woman. As a result of this and similar incidents,
elected officials often support new intermediate sanctions but then take
pains to limit eligibility to low-risk offenders. One illustration is the
series of recent federal proposals for boot camps for nonviolent first-
time youthful offenders. For reasons explained in the discussion of
boot camps in Section II below, young nonviolent first-offenders are
among the least appropriate imaginable participants in boot camps if
the aims include cost savings and reduced savings on prison beds.
Practitioners, particularly prosecutors and judges, also often resist
using intermediate sanctions for the offenders for whom they were
designed. Partly this is because they too are reluctant to be seen as
responsible for crimes committed by participants. This is why, as the
discussion of intensive supervision in Section II documents, judges are
often unwilling to cooperate in projects in which-as part of experi-
mental evaluations-target categories of offenders are to be randomly
assigned to a community penalty or incarceration.
Partly judges' "misuse" of intermediate sanctions occurs because
they believe new community penalties are more appropriate for some
offenders than either prison or probation. Forced by limited program
options to choose between prison and probation, they will often choose
probation because prison is seen as too severe or too disruptive of the
offender's and his family's lives, albeit with misgivings because they
believe ordinary probation too slight a sanction. Once house arrest or
intensive supervision become available, those penalties may appear
more appropriate than either probation or prison.
This not uncommon pattern of use of intermediate sanctions by
judges for offenders other than those program planners had in mind is
often pejoratively characterized as "net widening." That epithet over-
simplifies the problem. From the perspectives of the desirability of
proportionality in punishment and of availability of a continuum of
sanctions, the judge's preference to divert offenders from probation to
something more intrusive is understandable, perhaps admirable. From
the perspective of the designers of a program intended to save money
and prison space by diverting offenders from prison, however, the
judge's actions defy the program's rationale and obstruct achievement
of its goals.
Probably the most important lesson learned from fifteen years' expe-
rience with intermediate sanctions is that they are seldom likely to
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achieve their goals unless means can be found to set and enforce policies
governing their use. Otherwise, the combination of officials' risk aver-
sion and practitioners' preferences to be guided solely by their judg-
ments about appropriate penalties in individual cases are likely to un-
dermine program goals.
Means must be found to establish policies governing the choice of
sanction in individual cases. Two complementary means are available.
First, discretion to select sanctions can be shifted from judges and
prosecutors to corrections officials. "Back-end" programs to which of-
fenders are diverted from prison by corrections officials, or released
early, have been much more successful at saving money and prison
space than have "front-end" programs. Similarly, parole guidelines
have been much more successful and less controversial in reducing
parole-release disparities than have sentencing guidelines in reducing
sentencing disparities (Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1981; Blumstein et al.
1983, chap. 3 ). Presumably, these findings occur because decision
processes in bureaucracies can be placed in fewer peoples' hands and
can be regularized more readily by use of management controls than
can decisions of autonomous, politically selected judges.
Second, sentencing guidelines, which in many jurisdictions have
succeeded in reducing disparities in who goes to prison and for how
long (Tonry 1993), can be extended to govern choices among interme-
diate sanctions and between them and prison and probation. Some
states have made tentative steps in this direction and many are consid-
ering doing so. Section III below summarizes some of this experience
and suggests how current initiatives can be advanced.
First, though, to provide a necessary backdrop, Section I gives a
brief overview of problems that make reductions in recidivism, costs,
and prison use difficult to achieve. Section II summarizes experience
to date with the implementation and evaluation of various intermediate
sanctions, including boot camps, intensive supervision, house arrest
and electronic monitoring, day reporting centers, community service,
and day fines. Each of these sections provides an overview of program
characteristics and discusses evidence concerning various measures of
effectiveness, including implementation, net widening, and success at
reducing recidivism, saving money, and diminishing demand for
prison beds. The emphasis is mostly on American experience and re-
search, but research elsewhere, especially in England and Wales, is
touched on as appropriate.
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I. General Impediments to Effective Intermediate
Sanctions
In retrospect, it was naive (albeit from good intention) for promoters
of new intermediate sanctions to assure skeptics that recidivism rates
would fall, costs be reduced, and pressure on prison beds diminish if
new programs were established. The considerable pressures for net
widening and the formidable management problems involved in imple-
menting new programs interact in complex ways to frustrate new pro-
grams. Although these challenges are now well understood, that
knowledge has been hard won.
A. Recidivism
Consider first recidivism rates. From well-known evaluations of
community service (McDonald 1986), intensive supervision (Petersilia
and Turner 1993), and boot camps (McKenzie and Souryal 1994), to
mention only a few, comes a robust finding that recidivism rates (for
new crimes) of offenders sentenced to well-managed intermediate sanc-
tions do not differ significantly from those of comparable offenders
receiving other sentences. Recidivism and revocation rates for violation
of other conditions, by contrast, are generally higher.
From different perspectives, both findings may be seen as good or
bad. The finding of no effect on rates of new crime may be seen by
many as good if the offenders involved have been diverted from prison
and the new crimes they commit are not very serious. Sentences to
prison are much more expensive to administer than sentences to house
arrest, intensive supervision, or day reporting centers, and if the latter
are no less effective at reducing subsequent criminality, they can poten-
tially provide nearly comparable public safety at greatly reduced cost.
But they do not provide "comparable public safety": by definition,
crimes committed in the community by people who would have been
in prison would not otherwise have occurred. Thus, if diverted inter-
mediate sanction participants commonly commit violent or sexual
crimes, "no difference in recidivism rates" provides little solace. If,
however, participants seldom commit violent or sexual crimes, the
open-eyed choice that must be made is between avoidable minor crimes
and substantial costs to hold people in prison. The suggestion that
every offender be confined until he will no longer offend is impractica-
ble. Property offenders particularly have high reoffending rates, more
than 30 percent of American and English males are arrested for non-
trivial crimes by age thirty, and all offenders cannot be confined for-
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ever. In effect, this trade between costs and allowing avoidable crimes
to happen is made whenever community sentencing programs are es-
tablished.
From the other side of the punishment continuum, the finding of
no effect on new crimes raises different issues. If ordinary probation
is no less effective at preventing new crimes than is a new intermediate
sanction at three times the cost, the case for sentencing offenders to the
new program instead of probation cannot be made on cost-effectiveness
terms. That does not mean that no case can be made; Petersilia and
Turner (1993), among others, have offered the just-desert argument
for intermediate sanctions that they can deliver a punishment that is
more intrusive and burdensome than probation and appropriately pro-
portioned to the offender's guilt. This is a plausible argument, but it
shifts the rationale from utilitarian claims about crime and cost reduc-
tions to normative claims about the quality of justice.
The equally robust finding that participants in intermediate sanc-
tions typically have higher rates of violation of technical conditions
than comparable offenders otherwise punished provokes a not-quite-
parallel set of concerns. Most observers agree that the raised violation
(and related raised revocation) rates result from the greater likelihood
that violations will be discovered in intensive programs, and not from
greater underlying rates of violation. From a "the law must keep its
promises" perspective, the higher failure rates are good. Offenders
should comply with conditions, and consequences should attach when
they do not.
The contrary view is that the higher failure rates expose the unreality
and injustice of conditions-like prohibitions of drinking or drug use
or expectations that offenders will conform to middle-class behavioral
standards they have never observed before-that many offenders will
foreseeably breach and that do not involve criminality. Many offenders
have great difficulty in achieving conventional, law-abiding patterns of
living, and many will stumble along the way; a traditional social work
approach to community corrections would expect and accept the stum-
bles (so long as they do not involve significant new crimes) and hope
that through them, with help, the offender will learn to be law-abiding.
From this perspective, it is an advantage of low-intensity programs
that they uncover few violations and a disadvantage of high-intensity
programs that they do.
Thus the evaluation findings on recidivism and revocation rates elicit
different reactions from different people and in light of different con-
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ceptions of how the corrections system ought to work. In addition,
however, they illuminate a major impediment to aspirations to reduce
prison use by means of establishment of intermediate sanctions.
B. Prison Beds
If all offenders in a community program were diverted from prison,
a 30 percent revocation rate for technical violations (whatever the rate
for new-crime violations, but here assuming 20 percent) would not be
an insurmountable problem. The net savings in prison beds would be
the number of persons diverted multiplied by the average time they
would otherwise spend in prison less the number of persons revoked
for violations multiplied by their average term to be served. Unless
the gross revocation rate approached 100 percent or the average time
to be served after revocation exceeded the average time that would
have been served if not diverted, bed savings are inevitable.
The combination of net widening and elevated rates of technical
violations and revocations makes the calculation harder and makes
prison bed savings difficult to achieve. For front-end programs, a 50
percent rate of prison diversion is commonly counted a success. Con-
sider how the numbers work out. The 50 percent diverted from prison
saves prison beds, on the calculation and assumptions described in the
preceding paragraph. The 50 percent diverted from probation are a
different story. They would not otherwise have occupied prison beds,
and if half (on the 30 percent technical, 20 percent new crime revoca-
tion assumptions) suffer revocation and imprisonment, they represent
new demand for beds, and a higher demand than would otherwise
exist because many more of their technical violations will be discovered
and acted on.
Whether a particular program characterized by 50 percent prison
diversion will save or consume net prison beds depends on why offend-
ers' participation is revoked, in what percentage of cases, whether they
are sent to prison, and for how long. But 50 percent is a high assumed-
diversion rate. If the true rate is 30 percent or 20 percent, net prison
bed savings are unlikely.
C. Cost Savings
The third often-claimed goal of intermediate sanctions is to save
money. Interaction of all the preceding difficulties make dollar savings
unlikely except in the best of cases. If a majority of program partici-
pants are diverted from probation rather than from prison, and if tech-
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nical violation and revocation rates are higher in the intermediate sanc-
tion than in the ordinary probation and parole programs to which
offenders would otherwise be assigned, the chances of net cost savings
are slight. For boot camps, for example, assuming typical levels of
participant noncompletion and typical levels of postprogram revoca-
tion, Parent has calculated that "the probability of imprisonment has
to be around 80 percent just to reach a break-even point-that is, to
have a net impact of zero on prison bed-space" (1994, p. 9).
Cost analyses must, however, look beyond diversion rates, revoca-
tion rates, and prison beds. At least three other considerations are
important. First is the issue of transactions costs. Net-widening pro-
grams that shift probationers to intensive supervision and then shift
some of those to prison cost the state more because they use up addi-
tional prison space. But in addition they create new expenses for proba-
tion offices, prosecutors, courts, and corrections agencies in adminis-
tering each of those transfers. Correctional cost-benefit analyses often
ignore cost ramifications for other agencies, but the other agencies
must either pay additional costs or refuse to cooperate. An example:
community corrections officials often complain that courts sometimes
do not take violations seriously and that, when they do, police assign
such low priority to execution of arrest warrants for program violators
that they are in effect meaningless (e.g., McDonald 1986).
Second is the problem of marginal costs. Especially in the 1980s,
promoters of new programs commonly contrasted the average annual
costs per offender of administering a new program (say, $4,500) with
the average annual cost of housing one prisoner (say, $18,500) and
claimed substantial potential cost savings. This ignores the complexi-
ties presented by net widening and raised revocation rates, but it also
ignores a more important problem of scale.
For an innovative small program of fifty to one hundred offenders
(and many were and are of this size or smaller), the valid comparison is
with the marginal, not the average, costs of housing diverted offenders.
Unless a prison or a housing unit will be closed or not opened because
the system has fifty fewer inmates, the only savings will be incremental
costs for food, laundry, supplies, and other routine items. The major
costs of payroll, administration, debt service, and maintenance will be
little affected. In a prison system with 5,000, 15,000, or 50,000 in-
mates, the costs saved by diverting a few hundred are scarcely no-
ticeable.
Third is the issue of savings to the larger community associated with
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crimes avoided by incapacitating offenders. If believable values could
be attached to crimes that would be averted by imprisonment but that
would occur if offenders were assigned to community penalties, they
would provide important data for considering policy options. Unfortu-
nately, this is a subject that has as yet received little sustained atten-
tion. Some conservative writers (e.g., Zedlewski 1987; Dilulio 1990;
Barr 1992) have claimed that increased use of imprisonment is highly
cost-effective. Kleiman and Cavanagh (1990), for example, claimed
"benefits of incarcerating that one inmate for a year at between $172,000
and $2,364,000" (emphasis in original).
Liberal scholars have responded by showing the implausibility of
many of the assumptions made in such calculations. Zimring and
Hawkins (1991, p. 429), for example, showed that, on the assumptions
made in Zedlewski's analysis about the number of crimes prevented
for each inmate confined, the 237,000 increase in the prison population
that occurred between 1977 and 1986 should "have reduced crime to
zero on incapacitation effects alone ... on this account, crime disap-
peared some years ago."
One of the conservative contributors to this debate later recanted
more extreme claims and concluded that "the truth, we find, lies ...
arguably closer to the liberal than to the conservative view" (Dilulio
and Piehl 1991). These debates have, however, been more ideological
than scientific and offer little guidance for thinking about intermediate
sanctions. What is left is the need mentioned earlier to weigh the kinds
of risks particular offenders present with the costs that will be incurred
if alternate sanctioning choices are made.
No one who has worked with the criminal justice system should be
surprised by the observation that the system is complex and that eco-
nomic and policy ramifications ripple through it when changes are
made in any one of its parts. Sometimes that truism has been over-
looked to the detriment of programs on behalf of which oversimplified
claims were made. Georgia, for example, operated a pioneering front-
end intensive supervision program (ISP) that was at one time claimed
to have achieved remarkably low recidivism rates (for new crimes) and
to have saved Georgia the cost of building two prisons (Erwin 1987;
Erwin and Bennett 1987). It was later realized that many or most of
those sentenced to ISP were low-risk offenders convicted of minor
crimes who otherwise would have received probation. From serving
initially as an exemplar of successful ISP programs that save money
and reduce recidivism rates, Georgia's ISP program now serves as
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an exemplar of netwidening programs that increase system costs and
produce higher rates of revocation for violations of technical conditions
(Clear and Byrne 1992, p. 321).
II. Experience with Intermediate Sanctions
Writing about experience with intermediate sanctions bears some re-
semblance to shooting at a moving target. Although it typically takes
at least three years from the time an evaluation is conceived until results
are published, the programs themselves keep changing. Thus MacKen-
zie (1994), describing the results of an assessment of boot camps in
eight states, took pains to explain that some of them changed signifi-
cantly during and after the assessment. For example, the South Caro-
lina program, initially a front-end program with admission controlled
by the judge (and thus highly vulnerable to net widening) was reorga-
nized as a back-end program in which participants were selected by the
department of corrections from among offenders sentenced to prison.
Similarly, programs in some states that had focused primarily on disci-
pline and physical labor were reorganized to include a much larger
component of drug treatment and educational opportunities.
Still, an evaluation literature has continued to accumulate, and les-
sons learned in some states a few years ago can be useful to policy
makers in other states that are designing new programs or redesigning
old ones. In order, the following subsections discuss research on boot
camps, ISP, house arrest and electronic monitoring, day reporting cen-
ters, community service, and day fines.
A prefatory note is required. The evaluation literature for the most
part raises doubts about the effectiveness of intermediate sanctions at
achieving the goals their promoters have commonly set. This does not
mean that there are no effective programs. Only a handful have been
carefully evaluated. Many of those have in the aftermath been altered.
Many sophisticated and experienced practitioners believe that their
programs are effective, and some no doubt are. The evaluation litera-
ture does not "prove" that programs cannot succeed; instead, it shows
that many have not and that managers can learn from these past experi-
ences. Sometimes that learning may be expressed as program adapta-
tions intended to make achievement of existing goals more likely.
Sometimes, it may lead to a reconceptualization of goals.
The evaluation literature concerning intermediate sanctions is slight,
which at first impression may seem surprising given that new programs
have proliferated in every state. To anyone knowledgeable about cor-
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rectional research, the relatively small amount of research will be less
surprising: private foundations are conspicuously uninterested in crim-
inal justice research, neither of the relevant specialized national funding
agencies-the National Institute of Corrections and the State Justice
Institute-spends much on research, and the National Institute of Jus-
tice must spread its limited research funds among a wide range of
subjects.
The available literature consists of a handful of fairly sophisticated
evaluations funded by the National Institute of Justice; a larger number
of smaller, typically less sophisticated studies of local projects; and a
large number of uncritical descriptions of innovative programs. There
have been a number of efforts to synthesize the evaluation literature
on intermediate sanctions, sometimes in edited collections (McCarthy
1987; Byrne, Lurigio, and Petersilia 1992; Tonry and Hamilton 1995),
sometimes in unified books (Tonry and Will 1988; Morris and Tonry
1990). Given the time consumed in writing and publishing books, the
collections and syntheses are current as of a year or two before their
publication dates.
In order to keep this essay to a manageable length, the discussion
of each intermediate sanction is held to a few pages and emphasizes the
more substantial evaluations and literature reviews. In some cases-for
example, concerning ISP (Petersilia and Turner 1993) and boot camps
(MacKenzie 1994; MacKenzie and Piquero 1994)-relatively recent
and detailed literature reviews are available for readers who want more
information. In other cases-for example, concerning fines (Hillsman
1990) and community service (Pease 1985)-the best literature reviews
are more dated: there has been relatively little American research on
those subjects in recent years, but those articles, despite their dates,
cover most of the important research. In still other cases, notably in-
cluding day reporting centers, most of the available literature is de-
scriptive, and no literature reviews are available.
A. Boot Camps
The emerging consensus from assessments of boot camps (also some-
times called "shock incarceration") must be discouraging to their found-
ers and supporters. Although promoted as a means to reduce recidi-
vism rates, corrections costs, and prison crowding, most boot camps
have no discernible effect on subsequent offending and increase costs
and crowding (Parent 1994; MacKenzie 1994). The reasons are those
sketched in Section I above. Most have been front-end programs that
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have drawn many of their participants from among offenders who
otherwise would not have been sent to prison. In many programs, a
third to half of participants fail to complete the program and are sent
to prison as a result. In most programs, close surveillance of offenders
after completion and release produces rates of violations of technical
conditions and of revocations that are higher than for comparable of-
fenders in less intensive programs.
The news is not all bad. Back-end programs to which imprisoned
offenders are transferred by corrections officials for service of a 90- or
180-day boot camp sentence in lieu of a longer conventional sentence
do apparently save money and prison space, although they too often
experience high failure rates and higher than normal technical violation
and revocation rates.
Boot camp prisons have spread rapidly since the first two were estab-
lished in Georgia and Oklahoma in 1983. By April 1993, according to
a National Institute of Justice report (MacKenzie 1993), thirty states
and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons were operating boot camps. According
to the results of a survey of local jurisdictions in May 1992, ten jail
boot camps were then in operation, and thirteen other jurisdictions
were planning to open jail boot camps in 1992 or 1993 (Austin, Jones,
and Bolyard 1993). The earliest were opened in 1986 in New Orleans
and in 1988 in Travis County, Texas.
Boot camps vary widely in their details (MacKenzie and Parent 1992;
MacKenzie and Piquero 1994). Some last 90 days, some 180. Admis-
sion in some states is controlled by judges, in others by corrections
officials. Some primarily emphasize discipline and self-control; others
incorporate extensive drug and other rehabilitation elements. Some
eject a third to half of participants, others less than 10 percent. Most
admit only males, usually under age twenty-five, and often subject
to crime of conviction and criminal history limits, though there are
exceptions to each of these generalizations.
The reasons for boot camps' popularity are self-evident. Many
Americans have experienced life in military boot camps and remember
the experience as not necessarily pleasant but as an effective way to
learn self-discipline and to learn to work as part of a team. Images of
offenders participating in military drill and hard physical labor make
boot camps look demanding and unpleasant, characteristics that crime-
conscious officials and voters find satisfying. A series of studies by the
Public Agenda Foundation in Delaware, Alabama, and Pennsylvania
of citizen support for intermediate sanctions, for example, found that
112 Michael Tonry and Mary Lynch
the public is more supportive of intermediate sanctions than is widely
known but also found that they want such penalties to be burdensome
and for that reason were especially in favor of boot camps (Doble and
Klein 1989; Doble, Immerwahr, and Robinson 1991; Public Agenda
Foundation 1993).
Most of what we know about the effects of boot camps on partici-
pants comes from a series of studies by MacKenzie and colleagues at
the University of Maryland (e.g., MacKenzie and Shaw 1990, Macken-
zie 1993, 1994; MacKenzie and Souryal 1994), from a U.S. General
Accounting Office survey of research and experience (1993), and from
an early descriptive overview of boot camps commissioned by the Na-
tional Institute of Justice (Parent 1989).
The conclusions with which this subsection began are drawn from
MacKenzie's work and later analyses by Parent. In addition to findings
on completion rates, recidivism rates, and cost and prison bed savings,
MacKenzie and her colleagues looked closely in Louisiana at effects on
prisoners' self-esteem (MacKenzie and Shaw 1990). One early hypothe-
sis concerning boot camps was that successful completion would in-
crease participants' self-esteem, which would in turn lead to more ef-
fective participation in the free community and reduced recidivism.
The first half of the hypothesis was found to be correct; using psycho-
metric measures, MacKenzie and Shaw found that successful partici-
pants' self-esteem was enhanced compared with comparable prisoners
in conventional prisons. Unfortunately, later assessments of successful
participants after release found that their enhanced self-esteem soon
disappeared (a plausible explanation for why the second half of the
hypothesis concerning recidivism was not confirmed).
One tentative finding concerning possible positive effects of rehabili-
tative programs on recidivism merits emphasis. Although MacKenzie
and her colleagues concluded overall that boot camps do not by them-
selves result in reduced recidivism rates, they found evidence in Illi-
nois, New York, and Louisiana of "lower rates of recidivism on some
measures" that they associated with strong rehabilitative emphases in
those states' boot camps (MacKenzie 1994, p. 16). An earlier article
describes a "somewhat more positive" finding that graduates under
intensive supervision after release "appear to be involved in more posi-
tive social activities (e.g., work, attending drug treatment) than similar
offenders on parole or probation" (MacKenzie and Souryal 1993, p.
465).
Boot camps illustrate most vividly of all intermediate sanctions the
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FIG. 1.-Two-hundred-bed, ninety-day boot camp (nine-month reduction).
Source.-Parent (1994).
ways in which net widening, rigorous enforcement of conditions, and
high revocation rates can produce the unintended side effect of in-
creased costs and prison use from programs intended to reduce both.
Both MacKenzie (MacKenzie and Piquero 1994) and Parent (1994) have
used models developed by Parent for predicting the prison use implica-
tions of boot camps in light of various assumptions about net widening;
within-program failure rates; and postprogram revocation rates, includ-
ing estimates of time to failure, time to revocation, and length of time
in the boot camp, length of time in prison if not sent to the boot camp,
and length of time in prison following failure or revocation.
Figure 1, taken from Parent's work (1994), shows the effects on
prison beds of a hypothetical 90-day 200-bed facility on different as-
sumptions of prison diversion and postprogram revocation and reincar-
ceration. Other assumptions of failure rates within the program and
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FIG. 2.-Effects on prison bed needs of prison diversion rates, New York.
Source.-MacKenzie and Piquero (1994).
lengths of confinement in lieu of boot camp and after revocation, based
on averages documented in MacKenzie's eight-state assessment, are
built into the model. The diagonal lines show the effects of different
postprogram reincarceration rates on prison bed demand. At the lower
15 percent rate, boot camps create a net demand for additional prison
beds if less than half those in the program would otherwise have gone
to prison. At the more realistic 40 percent rate, at least 80 percent of
participants must have been diverted from prison before prison beds
are saved.
MacKenzie (1994) developed similar estimates for states in her eight-
state assessment. Figure 2 shows estimates based on data from New
York's boot camps of bed savings given various assumptions about
prison diversion. Savings occur only if at least 75 percent of partici-
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pants are diverted from prison and, sizable savings occur only if nearly
all are diverted.
If a primary goal of boot camps is to reduce prison use, the policy
implications of research on boot camps are straightforward. Parent
(1994, p. 10) sees at least three: "First, boot camps should recruit
offenders who have a very high probability of imprisonment." This
means that participants should be selected by corrections officials from
among prisoners rather than by judges from among sentenced offend-
ers. Second, boot camps should minimize failure rates by reducing
in-program failures and post-release failures. This means that miscon-
duct within the boot camp should be punished within the boot camp
whenever possible rather than by transfer to a regular prison and that
misconduct after release should be dealt with within the supervision
program whenever possible rather than by revocation and reincarcera-
tion. Third, participants in boot camps should be selected from among
prisoners who otherwise would serve a substantial term of imprison-
ment. Transfer of prisoners serving nine-month terms to a 180-day
boot camp is unlikely to reduce costs and system crowding. Transfer
of prisoners serving two- or three-year mandatory minimum terms is
likely to reduce both.
Corrections officials are aware of these findings. Some states-for
example, New York-already operate boot camps that draw their cli-
entele from state prisons and that result in much shorter terms of
confinement for those who complete the program (including many who
thereby avoid mandatory minimums). Other states, like South Caro-
lina, have shifted from judicial to correctional selection of participants.
One implication is clear, however: "Boot camps for nonviolent first
offenders," though often proposed, are unlikely to accomplish any of
the aims for boot camps that are generally offered.
B. Intensive Supervision
Intensive supervision for probationers and parolees was initially the
most popular intermediate sanction, has the longest history, and has
been the most extensively and ambitiously evaluated. Intensive super-
vision has been the subject of the only multisite experimental evalua-
tion involving random allocation of eligible offenders to ISP and to
whatever the otherwise appropriate sentence would have been (Petersi-
lia and Turner 1993).
Evaluation findings parallel those for boot camps. Front-end pro-
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grams in which judges control placement tend to draw more heavily
from offenders who would otherwise receive less restrictive sentences
than from offenders who would otherwise have gone to prison or jail.
The multisite ISP evaluation by the RAND Corporation, in which
jurisdictions agreed in advance to cooperate with a random assignment
system for allocating offenders to sanctions, was unable to evaluate
front-end ISP programs when judges refused to accept the outcomes
of the randomization system (Petersilia and Turner 1993). Back-end
programs draw from prison populations, but even for some of these
programs, suggestions have been made that their creation may lead
judges to sentence more minor offenders to "a taste of prison" in the
belief that they will quickly be released into ISP (Clear 1987).
Like the boot camp evaluations, the ISP evaluations have concluded
that offenders sentenced to ISP do not have lower recidivism rates for
new crimes than do comparable offenders receiving different sentences
but, instead, typically (because of closer surveillance) experience higher
rates of violation of technical conditions and higher rates of revocation.
Also as with boot camps, early proponents argued that ISP, while
reducing recidivism rates and rehabilitating offenders, would save
money and prison resources (Petersilia, Lurigio, and Byrne 1992, pp.
ix-x); evaluations suggest that the combination of net widening, high
revocation rates, and related case processing costs makes the cost sav-
ings claims improbable for most programs.
There is one tantalizing positive finding from the ISP evaluation
literature that parallels a boot camp finding (MacKenzie and Souryal
1993): ISP did succeed in some sites in increasing participants' involve-
ment in counseling and other treatment programs (Petersilia and
Turner 1993). The drug treatment literature demonstrates that partici-
pation, whether voluntary or coerced, can reduce both drug use and
crime by drug-using offenders (Anglin and Hser 1990; President's
Commission on Model State Drug Laws 1993). Because Drug Use
Forecasting data (e.g., National Institute of Justice 1994) indicate that
half to three-fourths of arrested felons in many cities test positive for
drug abuse, ISP may hold promise as a device for getting addicted
offenders into treatment and keeping them there (Gendreau, Cullen,
and Bonta 1994).
Few corrections programs are new in the sense that they have not
been tried before: house arrest, supervision of variable intensity, treat-
ment conditions, community service, restitution, intermittent or par-
tial confinement-they have all long been used on a case-by-case basis
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as conditions of probation. Modern ISP, however, is different in that
it follows a previous generation of similar programs that was the subject
of widespread programmatic adoption and evaluation.
From the 1950s through the early 1970s, probation departments
experimented with caseload size in order to learn whether smaller case-
loads permitting more contact between officers and probationers would
enable officers to provide more and better services and thereby enhance
probation's rehabilitative effectiveness. The best-known project, in
California, featured caseloads ranging from "intensive" (20 offenders)
to "ideal" (50), "normal" (70-130), and "minimum" (several hundred).
Lower caseloads produced more technical violations but indistinguish-
able crime rates (Carter, Robinson, and Wilkins 1967).
A later survey of the experience of forty-six separate (mostly Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration-funded) programs found that
intensive supervision programs had no effect on recidivism rates or
increased them, and diverted few offenders from prison but recruited
instead mostly from people who otherwise would have received proba-
tion (Banks et al. 1977). Not surprisingly, ISP based on rehabilitative
rationales withered away.
Contemporary programs, with caseloads ranging from two officers
to twenty-five probationers to one officer to forty probationers, are
typically based on surveillance, cost, and punishment rationales. More
frequent contacts between officer and offender (in some programs, as
many as twenty or thirty per month) lead to closer surveillance, which
in turn enhances public safety by making it likelier that misconduct
will be discovered and punished. Because of closer surveillance, low-
to mid-risk offenders can be diverted from prison to less costly ISP
without jeopardizing public safety. Because of the frequency of con-
tacts, subjection to unannounced urinalysis tests for drugs, and rigor-
ous enforcement of restitution, community service, and other condi-
tions, ISP will be much more punitive than conventional probation.
Contemporary ISP programs are of three types, each with an exem-
plar that was the subject of a major National Institute of Justice-
funded evaluation. Georgia established the most noted "prison diver-
sion" program to which convicted offenders were sentenced by judges
under criteria that directed the judge to use ISP only for offenders
who otherwise would have been sent to prison. An in-house evaluation
concluded that most ISP participants had been diverted from prison
and, on the basis of comparisons with a matched group of offenders
who were imprisoned, that the program had achieved lower recidivism
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rates and had reduced prison use (Erwin 1987). Subsequent analyses
by others concluded that most participants had not been diverted from
prison, that the comparison group was not comparable, that low rates
of new crimes resulted not from the program but from the low-risk
nature of the offenders, and that prison beds had not been saved (Mor-
ris and Tonry 1990, chap. 7; Clear and Byrne 1992).
The second form, "prison-release ISP," had as its evaluated exem-
plar a New Jersey program to which low-risk prisoners were released
after a careful seven-step screening process and then placed in low
caseloads with frequent contacts and urinalyses and rigorously en-
forced conditions. A major evaluation, based on a post hoc comparison
group, concluded that the program was effectively implemented, re-
duced recidivism rates, and saved public moneys (Pearson 1987). Sub-
sequent analyses by others accepted the implementation finding but
challenged the recidivism findings (because the comparison group ap-
peared to consist of higher-risk offenders and thus was not comparable)
and the cost findings (nearly half of the initial participants were sent
back to prison following revocation for breach of conditions, which,
given the short sentences they would otherwise have served and the
costs of processing the revocations, made cost-savings claims suspect)
(Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 7). Clear hypothesized that judges
might sentence low-risk minor offenders to prison in the belief that
they would be released to ISP and that, if under 2 percent of the
eligible defendants were sentenced to prison on that basis, any possible
cost savings from ISP would be lost (Clear 1987).
The third form, "case management ISP," had as its evaluated exem-
plar a Massachusetts program designed by the state probation depart-
ment in which probationers were classified on the basis of risk of of-
fending (using a validated risk-classification instrument). The
evaluation documented significant implementation problems and con-
cluded that offenders given intense supervision were no likelier than
other comparable offenders to commit new crimes but were likelier to
have their probation revoked because of technical condition violations
(Byrne and Kelly 1989).
Notwithstanding the nonconfirmatory evaluation findings, ISP was
adopted in most states. A General Accounting Office survey in 1989
identified programs in forty states and the District of Columbia (U.S.
General Accounting Office 1990; Byrne and Pattavina 1992). Probably
they exist in every state: programs can be organized by state or county
correctional agencies; can be located in parole, probation, and prison
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departments; and as a result are easy to miss in national mail and phone
surveys.
Although ad hoc intensive supervision in individual cases presum-
ably occurs in every probation system, no other country has adopted
widespread programs of intensive probation. Small-scale pilot projects
were started in the Netherlands in 1993 (Tak 1994a, 1994b). In En-
gland, as in the United States, variable caseload projects to test treat-
ment effectiveness hypotheses were conducted in the 1960s and early
1970s, with the same discouraging results (Folkard et al. 1974, 1976),
and were soon abandoned. A series of pilot projects in eight sites,
linked with Home Office evaluations, has been under way in England
and Wales in the 1990s with as-yet inconclusive results. The programs
appear to have diverted offenders from prison and to have met with
approval from judges and probation officers, but in many sites they
seem to have encountered substantial implementation problems (Mair
1994; Mair et al. 1994). Findings on recidivism effects will not be
available until 1996 (or later).
Two exhaustive syntheses of the American ISP literature have been
published (U.S. General Accounting Office 1990; Petersilia and
Turner 1993) and do not differ significantly in their conclusions from
those offered here. One question that naturally arises is why ISP pro-
grams have survived and continue to be created. Unlike boot camps,
for which evaluation findings casting doubts on effectiveness are re-
cent, the ISP findings have been well known and accepted since at
least 1990. The answers appear to be that ISP's surveillant and punitive
properties satisfy a public preference that sanctions be demanding and
burdensome and that ISP is becoming seen as an appropriate mid-level
punishment. Petersilia, Lurigio, and Byrne (1992, p. xiv) note, "To
many observers, the goal of restoring the principle of just deserts to
the criminal justice system is justification enough for the continued
development of intermediate sanctions."
Here, too, the policy implications are straightforward. Because re-
cidivism rates for new crimes are no higher for ISP participants than
for comparable imprisoned offenders, ISP is a cost-effective prison
alternative for offenders who do not present unacceptable risks of vio-
lence. Intensive supervision programs may offer a promising tool for
facilitating treatment for drug-using offenders and can by themselves
and linked with other sanctions provide credible mid-level punish-
ments as part of a continuum of sanctions.
The challenges are to devise ways to assure that programs are used
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for the kinds of offenders for whom they are designed and to reduce
rates of revocation for technical violations. The former problem does
not exist for back-end early-release programs, and sentencing guide-
lines systems may hold promise for reducing the extent of net widening
in front-end'systems (see Section III below). The latter problem can
be addressed, as Lurigio and Petersilia (1992, p. 14) note, by imposing
only conditions that relate to a particular offender's circumstances
rather than by imposing long lists of general standard conditions.
C. House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring
The lines that distinguish community penalties begin to blur after
ISP. House arrest, often called "home confinement," has as a precursor
the curfew condition traditionally attached to many probation sen-
tences and may be ordered as a sanction in its own right or as a condi-
tion of ISP. Most affected offenders, however, do not remain in their
homes but instead are authorized to work or participate in treatment,
education, or training programs. Finally, house arrest is sometimes,
but not necessarily, backed up by electronic monitoring; Renzema
(1992), for example, reports that 10,549 people were on house arrest
in Florida in August 1990, of whom 873 were on electronic monitoring.
House arrest comes in front- and back-end forms. In an early Okla-
homa program (Meachum 1986), for example, prison inmates were
released early subject to participation in a home confinement program.
In Florida, which operates the largest and most diverse home confine-
ment programs, most are front-end programs in which otherwise
prison-bound offenders are supposed to be placed. In some states,
especially in connection with electronic monitoring, house arrest is
used in place of pretrial detention (Maxfield and Baumer 1990).
House arrest programs expanded rapidly beginning in the mid-
1980s. The earliest programs were typically small (from thirty to fifty
offenders) and often were composed mostly of driving-while-
intoxicated and minor property offenders (this was also true of most
of the early electronic monitoring programs) (Morris and Tonry 1990,
chap. 7).
Programs have grown and proliferated. The largest program is in
Florida where more than 13,000 offenders were on house arrest in 1993
(Blomberg, Bales, and Reed 1993). Programs coupled with electronic
monitoring, a subset, existed nowhere in 1982, in seven states in 1986,
and in all fifty states in October 1990 (Renzema 1992, p. 46).
Considered by itself, the use of electronic monitoring has grown
Intermediate Sanctions
even more from its beginnings in 1983 in the New Mexico courtroom
of Judge Michael Goss and the Florida courtroom of Judge J. Allison
DeFoor II (Ford and Schmidt 1985). In 1986, only ninety-five offend-
ers were subject to monitoring (Renzema 1992, p. 41), a number that
rose to 12,000 in 1990 (Baumer and Mendelsohn 1992, p. 54) and to a
daily count of 30,000-50,000 in 1992 and 1993 (Lilly 1993, p. 4).
Manufacturers of electronic monitoring equipment no doubt expect
eventually to sell their products worldwide. Within the English-
speaking countries, the United States is at present the major market.
In early 1993, the Northern Territory of Australia was the only state
operating front-end house arrest programs; Western Australia, South
Australia, and Queensland operated prison-release programs. Alto-
gether, these programs contained 330-400 offenders, of whom approxi-
mately half were subject to electronic monitoring (Biles 1993).
English policy makers toyed with electronic monitoring in the late
1980s and established a pilot project in three sites in 1989-90. Judges
and police were skeptical about the use of electronically monitored
house arrest as a custody alternative, and rates of offender noncompli-
ance were high (Mair and Nee 1990; Mair 1993a). The evaluators char-
acterized their findings as inconclusive. Although the Criminal Justice
Act of 1991 authorized use of electronic monitoring in conjunction
with curfew orders, no monitoring equipment was in use in England
and Wales late in 1994.
No American evaluations of electronic monitoring on the scale or
with the sophistication of the best on boot camps or ISP have been
published. One analysis of agency data for Florida's front-end house
arrest program concluded that it draws more offenders from among
the prison-bound than from the probation-bound (Baird and Wagner
1990). However, this conclusion is based on two dubious analyses.
The first looked to see whether offenders on house arrest should, under
Florida's sentencing guidelines, have been sentenced to confinement.
This seemingly straightforward calculation assumes, however, that the
guidelines then in effect were taken seriously by Florida judges and
significantly constrain their choices; the conclusion of a legislative
study committee is that they did not (Florida Legislature 1991).
The second diversion analysis was based on statistical comparison
of characteristics of samples of probationers, house arrest offenders,
and prisoners, and it concluded that those on house arrest more closely
resembled prisoners than probationers. This is like the ISP evaluations
in Georgia and New Jersey that were later challenged on the basis that
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seemingly comparable groups were not. Part of the problem lies in
inherent limits of efforts to use statistical models to create equivalent
comparison groups and part in the limited range of data about offenders
that is compiled in official records.
A case study of the development, implementation, and evolution of
a back-end program in Arizona cautions that house arrest programs
are likely to share the prospects and problems of intermediate sanctions
generally. Originally conceived as a money-saving system for early
release of low-risk offenders, the program-which combined house
arrest with electronic monitoring-wound up costing money. One
problem was that, in addition to satisfying stringent statutory criteria
(no violent or sex crimes, no prior felony convictions), inmates had to
be approved for release by the parole board, which proved highly risk
averse and released very few eligible inmates. When the program be-
came operational, the rate of revocation for technical violations (34
percent of participants) was twice that for ordinary parolees. Finally,
many probation officers began to justify the program, not as an early-
release system for low-risk offenders, but as a mechanism for establish-
ing tighter controls and closer surveillance for parolees than would
otherwise be possible (Palumbo, Clifford, and Snyder-Joy 1992).
There are no other large-scale evaluations. House arrest coupled
with electronic monitoring has been the subject of many small studies
and a linked set of three studies in Indianapolis (Baumer, Maxfield,
and Mendelsohn 1993). Both of two recent literature reviews (Baumer
and Mendelsohn 1992; Renzema 1992) stress the scantiness of the re-
search evidence on prison diversion, recidivism, and cost-effectiveness.
On recidivism, Renzema (1992, p. 49) notes that most of the "research
is uninterpretable because of shoddy or weak research designs."
Baumer and Mendelsohn (1992, pp. 64-65) stress that "the incapacita-
tive and public safety potential of this sanction has probably been
considerably overstated" because the technology cannot control offend-
ers' movement. They predict that house arrest will continue primarily
to be used for low-risk offenders and will play little role as a custody
alternative.
Thus, while a fair amount has been learned about the operation and
management of electronic monitoring systems, about technology, and
about implementation of new programs (e.g., Baumer and Mendelsohn
1992; Watts and Glaser 1992), the most comprehensive review of the
research observes that "we know very little about either home con-
finement or electronic monitoring" (Baumer and Mendelsohn 1992,
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p. 66). There seems little reason to believe that house arrest is any less
vulnerable to net widening than is ISP or likely to achieve different
findings on recidivism.
D. Day Reporting Centers
Day reporting centers, like the remaining two sanctions discussed,
community service and day fines, differ from those discussed so far in
that they were developed earlier and much more extensively outside
the United States than in. The earliest American day reporting cen-
ters-places in which offenders spend their days under surveillance
and participating in treatment and training programs while sleeping
elsewhere-date from the mid-1980s. The English precursors, origi-
nally called day centers and now probation centers, began operation
in the early 1970s. Most of our knowledge of American day reporting
centers comes from descriptive writing; no published literature as yet
provides credible findings on the important empirical questions.
The English programs date from creation of four "day-training cen-
tres" established under the Criminal Justice Act of 1972, charged to
provide intensive training programs for persistent petty offenders
whose criminality was believed rooted in general social inadequacy,
and from creation of ad hoc day centers for serious offenders that were
set up by a number of local probation agencies. The training centers
for a number of reasons were adjudged unsuccessful and were soon
canceled.
The probation-run day centers, however, thrived, becoming the
"flavor of the month" after enabling legislation was enacted in 1982,
numbering at least eighty by 1985, and serving thousands of offenders
by the late 1980s (Mair 1993b, p. 6). Programs vary, with some empha-
sizing control and surveillance more than others, some operating as a
therapeutic community, and most offering a wide range of (mostly
compulsory) activities. The maximum term of involvement is sixty
days, and some programs have set thirty-day or forty-five-day limits.
A major Home Office study (Mair 1988) concluded that "most cen-
tres unequivocally saw their aim as diversion from custody" (Mair
1993b, p. 6), that more than half of the participating offenders had
previously been imprisoned, and that 47 percent had six or more prior
convictions. A later reconviction study (Mair and Nee 1992) found a
two-year reconviction rate of 63 percent. However, Mair writes,
though "on the face of it this may look high ... the offenders targeted
by centres represent a very high-risk group in terms of probability of
124 Michael Tonry and Mary Lynch
reconviction" (Mair 1993b, p. 6). In addition, the reconviction data did
not distinguish between those who completed the program and those
who failed. The results were seen as so promising that the Criminal
Justice Act of 1991 envisioned a substantial expansion in use of day
reporting centers.
A 1989 survey for the National Institute of Justice identified twenty-
two day reporting centers in eight states (Parent 1990), though many
others have since opened. Most American centers opened after 1985.
The best-known (at least the best-documented) centers were estab-
lished in Massachusetts-in Springfield (Hampton County Sheriffs
Department) and in Boston (the Metropolitan Day Reporting Cen-
ter)-and both were based in part on the model provided by the En-
glish day centers (Larivee 1991; McDevitt and Miliano 1992).
As with the English centers, American programs vary widely. Many
are back-end programs into which offenders are released early from
jail or prison. Some, however, are front-end programs to which offend-
ers are sentenced by judges, and some are used as alternatives to pre-
trial detention (Parent 1990). Programs range in duration from forty
days to nine months, and program content varies widely (Parent 1991).
Most require development of hour-by-hour schedules of each partici-
pant's activities; some are highly intensive with ten-or-more supervi-
sion contacts per day; and a few include twenty-four-hour-per-day
electronic monitoring (McDevitt and Miliano 1992). Unfortunately, no
substantial evaluations have been published (a number of small in-
house evaluations are cited in Larivee [1991] and McDevitt and Miliano
[1992]).
E. Community Service
Community service is the most underused intermediate sanction in
the United States. Used in many countries as a mid-level penalty to
replace short prison terms for moderately severe crimes, community
service in the United States is used primarily as a probation condition
or as a penalty for trifling crimes like motor vehicle offenses. This is
a pity because community service is a burdensome penalty that meets
with widespread public approval (e.g., Doble, Immerwahr, and
Robinson 1991), is inexpensive to administer, produces public value,
and can be scaled to a degree to the seriousness of crimes.
Doing work to benefit the community as a substitute for other pun-
ishments for crime has a history that dates at least from Imperial Rome.
Modern use, however, is conventionally dated from a 1960s effort by
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judges in Alameda County, California, to avoid having to impose fines
for traffic violations on low-income women, when they knew that
many would be unable to pay and would be in danger of being sent
to jail as a result.
The California program attracted widespread interest and influenced
the establishment of community service programs in the United States
and elsewhere. The English pilot projects in the early 1970s (Young
1979), followed by Scottish pilots in the late 1970s (Mclvor 1992),
discussed below, both led to programs that have been fully institution-
alized as a penalty that lies between probation and imprisonment in
those countries' sentencing tariffs. Many millions of dollars were spent
in the 1970s by the American Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration, for programs for adults, and by the Office for Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, for programs for children, but with little
lasting effect (McDonald 1992).
Community service did not come into widespread use as a prison
alternative in the United States (Pease [1985] and McDonald [1986]
provide detailed accounts with many references). Largely as a result,
there has been little substantial research on the effectiveness of commu-
nity service as an intermediate punishment (Pease 1985; Morris and
Tonry 1990, chap. 6; McDonald 1992).
With the exception of one major American study (McDonald 1986),
the most ambitious evaluation research has been carried out elsewhere.
In England and' Wales, Scotland, and the Netherlands, community
service orders (CSOs) were statutorily authorized with the express aim
that they serve as an alternative to short-term incarceration. In each of
those countries, research was undertaken to discover whether CSOs
were being used as replacements for short-term prison sentences (gen-
erally, yes, in about half of cases) and whether their use had any
effect on recidivism rates for new crimes (generally, no). The American
study, of a pilot community service program in New York City in-
tended to substitute for jail terms up to six months, reached similar
results (McDonald 1986).
Community service orders in 1993 constituted 30 percent of all sen-
tences for serious crimes in England and Wales (Home Office 1994).
In law and in practice, CSOs are regarded as more intrusive and puni-
tive than probation and are considered an appropriate substitute for
imprisonment (Lloyd 1991). Community service orders can involve
between 40 and 240 hours of work supervised by a community service
officer; failure to participate or cooperate can result in revocation. It is
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generally estimated that half of those sentenced to community service
would otherwise be sentenced to prison and half to less severe penalties
(Pease 1985). Reoffending rates are believed and generally found to be
neither higher nor lower than those of comparable offenders sent to
prison (Pease 1985).
The Scottish experience trails several years behind the English but
closely resembles it. An experimental program was established in 1977;
permanent enabling legislation was enacted in 1978; and CSOs were
implemented nationwide in the early 1980s. Offenders are sentenced
to 40-240 hours of work to be completed within one year. A five-year-
long evaluation concluded that half of offenders sentenced to CSOs
would otherwise have been confined, that both judges and offenders
thought community service an appropriate penalty, and that reconvic-
tion rates after three years (63 percent) compared favorably with recon-
viction rates following incarceration (Mclvor 1992, 1993).
The story in the Netherlands, where 10 percent of convicted offend-
ers were sentenced to community service in 1992, and where govern-
ment policy calls for successive annual 10 percent increases in the
number of CSOs ordered, is similar. Pilot projects began in 1981 with
the express aim of establishing a penalty that would be used in place
of short terms of imprisonment. The British pattern of a maximum
sentence of 240 hours to be performed within one year was followed.
Evaluations reached the by-now expected conclusion that recidivism
rates were no worse but that judges were using CSOs both for other-
wise prison-bound and otherwise suspended sentence-bound offenders
(with the balance as yet unknown) (van Kalmthout and Tak 1992; Tak
1994a, 1994b). In 1989, the Penal Code was amended to institutionalize
CSOs as authorized sanctions.
The only well-documented American community service project,
operated by the Vera Institute of Justice, was established in 1979 in
the Bronx, one of the boroughs of New York, and eventually spread
to Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens. The program was designed as
a credible penalty for repetitive property offenders who had previously
been sentenced to probation or jail and who faced a six-month or longer
jail term for the current conviction. Offenders were sentenced to sev-
enty hours community service under the supervision of Vera foremen.
Participants were told that attendance would be closely monitored and
that nonattendance and noncooperation would be punished. An agree-
ment was struck with the judiciary that immediate arrest warrants
would be issued and prompt revocation hearings held for noncompliant
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participants. The goal was to draw half of participants from the target
prison-bound group and half from offenders with less extensive rec-
ords; after initial judicial reluctance was overcome (when only a third
were prison diversions), the fifty-fifty balance was achieved. An exten-
sive and sophisticated evaluation concluded that recidivism rates were
unaffected by the program, that prison diversion goals were being met,
and that the program saved taxpayers' money (McDonald 1986, 1992).
For offenders who do not present unacceptable risks of future violent
(including sexual) crimes, a punitive sanction that costs much less than
prison to implement, that promises no higher reoffending rates, and
that creates negligible risks of violence by those who would otherwise
be confined has much to commend it.
Both American and European research and experience show that
community service can serve as a meaningful, cost-effective sanction
for offenders who would otherwise have been imprisoned. Why it has
not been used in that way in the United States is a matter for conjec-
ture, to which I return in Section III below.
F. Monetary Penalties
Monetary penalties for nontrivial crimes have yet to catch on in the
United States. That is not to deny that millions of fines are imposed
every year. Studies conducted as part of a fifteen-year program of fines
research coordinated by the Vera Institute of Justice showed that fines
are nearly the sole penalty for traffic offenses and in many courts are
often imposed for misdemeanors (Hillsman, Sichel, and Mahoney
1984; Cole et al. 1987). And in many courts, most fines are collected.
Although ambiguous lines of authority and absence of institutional
self-interest sometimes result in haphazard and ineffective collection,
courts that wish to do so can be effective collectors (Cole 1992).
Nor is it to deny that convicted offenders in some jurisdictions are
routinely ordered to pay restitution and in most jurisdictions are rou-
tinely ordered to pay growing lists of fees for probation supervision,
for urinalyses, and for use of electronic monitoring equipment. A sur-
vey of monetary exactions from offenders carried out in the late 1980s
identified more than thirty separate charges, penalties, and fees that
were imposed by courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures
(Mullaney 1988). These commonly included court costs, fines, restitu-
tion, and payments to victim compensation funds. They often included
a variety of supervision and monitoring fees and, in some jurisdictions
(including the federal system under the Sentencing Reform Act of
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1984), extended to repayment to the government of the full costs of
prosecution and of carrying out any sentence imposed.
The problem is neither that monetary penalties are not imposed nor
that they cannot be collected, but that, as Cole and his colleagues
reported when summarizing the results of a national survey of judges'
attitudes about fines, "at present, judges do not regard the fine alone
as a meaningful alternative to incarceration or probation" (Cole et al.
1987).
This American inability to see a fine as a serious penalty stands in
marked contrast to the legal systems of other countries. In the Nether-
lands, the fine is legally presumed to be the preferred penalty for every
crime, and Section 359(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires
judges to provide a statement of reasons in every case in which a fine
is not imposed. In Germany in 1986, for another example, 81 percent
of all sentenced adult criminals were ordered to pay a fine, including
73 percent of those convicted of crimes of violence (Hillsman and
Greene 1992, p. 125). In Sweden in 1979, fines constituted 91 percent
of all sentences (Casale 1981). In England in 1980, fines were imposed
in 47 percent of convictions for indictable offenses (roughly equivalent
to American felonies); these included 45 percent of convicted sex of-
fenders, 24 percent of burglars, and half of those convicted of assault
(Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 4).
European monetary penalties for serious crimes take two forms. The
first is the "day fine," in use in the Scandinavian countries since the
turn of the century and in Germany since the 1970s, which scales fines
both to the defendant's ability to pay (some measure of daily income)
and to the seriousness of the crime (expressed as the number of daily
income units assessed) (Grebing 1982). The second is the use of the
fine as a prosecutorial diversion device; in exchange for paying the fine,
often the amount that would have been imposed after conviction, the
criminal charges are dismissed.
Only the day fine has attracted much American attention. Some of
the efforts to establish day-fine systems are discussed below. First,
though, some discussion of the remarkable success of prosecutorial
diversion programs seems warranted. In Sweden, prosecutors rou-
tinely invite defendants they intend to charge to accept a fine calculated
on day-fine principles in exchange for dismissal of the charges. Nearly
70 percent of fines are imposed in this way (Casale 1981; Morris and
Tonry 1990, p. 144).
Under Section 153a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, in
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effect since 1974, the prosecutor, if "convinced of the defendant's
guilt," may propose a conditional dismissal under which the defendant
agrees to pay a fine. If the charges are serious, the judge must approve
the arrangement (approval is seldom withheld). The defendant need
not confess guilt. Two hundred forty thousand cases were resolved by
conditional dismissal in 1989, constituting a 16 percent reduction in
indictments that would otherwise have been filed (Weigend 1993).
In the Netherlands, the 1983 Financial Penalties Act authorized
prosecutors to resolve criminal cases by means of an arrangement com-
parable to the German conditional dismissal. Defendants charged with
crimes bearing maximum possible six-year prison sentences are eligi-
ble. The prosecution is terminated but can be reinstated if the defen-
dant commits a new crime within three years. The prosecutorial diver-
sion program has been credited with keeping the number of criminal
trials stable between 1980 and 1992, despite a 60 percent increase in
recorded crime. Two thirds of criminal cases are settled out of court
by prosecutors (Tak 1994a).
Despite the substantial successes of fines as part of prosecutorial
diversion programs in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, the
day fine has received principal attention as a penal import from Europe.
The results to date are at best mildly promising. The initial pilot
project was conducted in Staten Island, New York, in 1988-89, again
under the auspices of the Vera Institute of Justice. Judges, prosecutors,
and other court personnel were included in the planning, and imple-
mentation was remarkably successful. Most judges cooperated with
the new voluntary scheme, the distribution of fines imposed changed
in ways that showed that judges were following the system, the average
fine imposed increased by 25 percent, the total amount ordered on all
defendants increased by 14 percent, and 70 percent of defendants paid
their fines in full (Hillsman and Greene 1992).
The Staten Island findings, while not unpromising, are subject to
two important caveats. First, the participating court had limited juris-
diction and handled only misdemeanors; the use of day fines for felon-
ies thus remains untested. Second, applicable statutes limited total
fines for any charge to $250, $500, or $1,000, depending on the misde-
meanor class, and thus artificially capped fines at those levels and pre-
cluded meaningful implementation of the scheme in relation to other
than the lowest-income defendants.
A second modest pilot project was conducted for twelve weeks in
1989 in Milwaukee (McDonald, Greene, and Worzella 1992), and four
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projects funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance operated for vari-
ous periods between 1992 and 1994 in Maricopa County (Phoenix),
Arizona; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Polk County, Iowa; and Coos, Jose-
phine, Malheur, and Marion Counties in Oregon (Turner 1992). The
Milwaukee project applied only to noncriminal violations, resulted in
reduced total collections, and was abandoned. The Phoenix project,
known as FARE (for Financial Assessments Related to Employability),
was conceived as a mid-level sanction between unsupervised and supervised
probation. The Iowa pilot included only misdemeanants, and the Ore-
gon projects included misdemeanants and probationable felonies (ex-
cluding Marion County, the largest, which covered only misdemean-
ants). Only in the Connecticut project did the pilot cover a range of
felonies and misdemeanors.
A RAND Corporation evaluation of the Arizona, Connecticut,
Iowa, and Oregon projects was funded by the National Institute of
Justice, but no results had been released by June 1995. Given the
limited reach of the projects, however, the results are unlikely to dem-
onstrate that day fines show promise of becoming an intermediate sanc-
tion capable-as in Europe-of diverting large numbers of felony of-
fenders from prison.
A further cautionary note comes from England and Wales, which
tried, unsuccessfully, to launch a day-fine system (because calculations
were based on weekly rather than daily income, it was called a "unit-
fine" system). Following a pattern that previous mentions of English
research on electronic monitoring and ISP will make familiar, pilot
projects to test the feasibility of unit fines were established in four
magistrates' courts and evaluated by the Home Office Research and
Planning Unit. The findings were positive: magistrates and other court
personnel were pleased with the new system, anticipated problems
about learning defendants' incomes proved soluble, low-income defen-
dants received smaller fines, and more fines were fully paid, and ear-
lier, than previously (Moxon, Sutton, and Hedderman 1990; Moxon
1992). As a result, the Criminal Justice Act of 1991, which effected a
substantial overhaul of English sentencing laws, established a national
system of unit fines to take effect in October 1992.
The unit-fines system was abandoned seven months later. The rea-
sons remain unclear. The immediate precipitant was a series of media
stories of preposterous sentences that discredited the entire system. In
one case, a defendant was fined £1,200 (late in 1994, = U.S.$1,920)
for throwing a potato chip bag on the ground. In another much-
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publicized case, a defendant was fined £500 for illegal parking after his
car, worth £250, broke down on a road where parking was prohibited
(Moxon 1993).
Why those (and many comparable) cases were sentenced as they
were, and why the government so quickly repudiated its own innova-
tion, are unclear. The immediate problem was overly literal application
of the system. The minimum unit was set at £4 and the maximum
unit at £100. To deal with the problem of defendants who do not
provide income information, the policy was set in some courts that the
maximum authorized amount would be presumed to apply in such
cases. What was not planned for was default cases in which the defen-
dant does not appear. What could have been a £20 fine in the illegal
parking case became instead £500. In the littering case, the £1,200 fine
was reduced to £48 on appeal.
The specific problems that deprived the scheme of its credibility and
led to its repeal were soluble. Some observers speculated that many
magistrates disapproved in principle of what were in effect sentencing
guidelines for fines and used overly literal enforcement to undermine
it. Some blamed the developers for setting the maximum unit amount
too high (£20 was the limit in the pilot projects) and for not anticipating
foreseeable problems in implementation and application. Whatever the
real explanation, the system is no longer, and developers of day-fine
systems in the United States will ignore the English experience at their
peril.
III. Is There a Future for Intermediate Sanctions?
Despite the seemingly disheartening evaluation findings that suggest
that most intermediate sanctions do not reduce recidivism, corrections
costs, and prison crowding while simultaneously enhancing public
safety, there is a future for intermediate sanctions.
There is a need to develop credible, enforceable sanctions between
prison and probation that can provide appropriate deserved penalties
for offenders convicted of mid-level crimes, and numerous studies doc-
ument the capacity of well-managed corrections departments to imple-
ment such programs. There is a need, for their sake and ours, to help
offenders establish conventional, law-abiding patterns of living, and
the evaluation literature suggests ways that can be facilitated. There is
a need to develop intermediate sanctions that can serve as cost-effective
substitutes for confinement, and the evaluation literature suggests how
that can be done. Finally, there is a need to devise ways to assure that
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intermediate sanctions are used for the kinds of offenders for whom
particular programs were created, and experience with parole and sen-
tencing guidelines shows how that can be done.
Three major obstacles stand in the way. The first, the most difficult,
is the modern American preoccupation with absolute severity of pun-
ishment and the related widespread view that only imprisonment
counts. The average lengths of prison sentences in the United States
are much greater in the United States than in other Western countries
(Tonry 1995, table 7-1). The ten-, twenty-, and thirty-year minimum
sentences that are in vogue for drug crimes are unimaginable in most
countries. Despite a trebling in the average severity of prison sentences
for violent crimes between 1976 and 1989 established by the National
Academy of Sciences Panel on the Understanding and Control of Vio-
lence (Reiss and Roth 1993), and additional increases since 1989, fed-
eral crime legislation passed in 1994 conditions prison construction
grants to states on substantial additional increases in sentences for vio-
lent offenders, using 1993 averages as a base (Wallace 1994).
This absolute severity frustrates efforts to devise intermediate sanc-
tions for the psychological (not to mention political) reason that few
other sanctions seem commensurable with a multiyear prison sentence.
Data presented above, for example, show that half or more offenders
convicted of violent crimes in Sweden, Germany, and England are
sentenced to fines (abandonment of unit fines in England did not result
in a reduction in use of fines, which continued to be imposed on a
"tariff" fixed-amount basis).
In those countries, the prison sentences thereby avoided would have
involved months or at most a few years, making a burdensome financial
penalty an imaginable alternative. By contrast, most of the American
day-fine pilot projects would use day fines as punishments for misde-
meanors or noncriminal ordinance violations or as a mid-level punish-
ment between supervised and unsupervised probation. Likewise, with
the rare exception of New York's community service project started
by the Vera Institute, CSOs are generally ordered as probation condi-
tions and not as sentences in their own right.
Data presented above, for another example, document successful
efforts to replace prison sentences of six or fewer months (moderately
severe penalties in those countries) with day fines in Germany
(Weigend 1992) and with community service orders in the Netherlands
(Tak 1994b). In Sweden, however, less than a quarter of prison sen-
tences are to terms of six months or longer (Jareborg 1994), and in the
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Netherlands less than 15 percent are for a year or longer. Equivalent
crimes in the United States would be punished by terms measured in
years; in 1991, 90 percent of state inmates were sentenced to terms
longer than one year, and 57 percent to terms longer than five years
(Beck et al. 1993).
Because the modern emphasis on absolute severity of crime is the
product of partisan and ideological politics, it will not readily be
changed. It does, however, stand in the way of substantial develop-
ment of a continuum of punishments in which moderately punitive and
intrusive sanctions serve as penalties-in place of incarceration-for
moderately severe crimes.
The second, not unrelated obstacle to fuller development of interme-
diate sanctions is widespread commitment to "just deserts" rationales
for punishment and the collateral idea that the severity of punishment
should vary directly with the seriousness of the crime. This has been
translated in the federal and most state sentencing guidelines systems
into policies that tie punishments to the offender's crime and criminal
history and little else.
Such policies and their commitment to "proportionality in punish-
ment" constitute a gross oversimplification of the cases that come be-
fore criminal courts. Crimes that share a label can be very different;
robberies range from schoolyard takings of basketballs to gangland
assaults on banks. Offenders committing the same crime can be very
different; a thief may have been motivated by a sudden impulse, by
the need to feed a hungry child, by a craving to buy drugs, or by a
conscious choice to make a living as a thief.
Punishments likewise vary. Despite a common label, two years' im-
prisonment can be served in a maximum security prison of fear and
violence, in a minimum security camp, at home under house arrest,
or in some combination of these and other regimes. Even a single
punishment may be differently experienced: three years' imprisonment
may be a rite-of-passage for a young gang member, a death sentence
for a frail seventy-year-old, or the ruin of the lives of an employed
forty-year-old man and his dependent spouse and children.
Nonetheless, commitment to ideas of proportionality is widespread,
and it circumscribes the roles that intermediate sanctions can play.
Although few people would disagree with the empirical observations
in the preceding paragraph, sentencing policies based on ideas of pro-
portionality somehow reify the sentencing categories into something
meaningful. If guidelines specify a twenty-four-month prison term for
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offense X with criminal history Y, it seems unfair to sentence one
offender to community service or house arrest when another similarly
situated (in the narrow terms of the guidelines) is sentenced to twenty-
four months. It seems more unfair to sentence one offender subject to
a twenty-four-month guidelines sentence to house arrest when an of-
fender convicted of a less serious crime receives an eighteen-month
prison sentence.
Commitment to proportionality interacts with the modern penchant
for severe penalties. If crimes punished by months of incarceration in
other countries are punished in years in the United States, comparisons
between offenders are more stark. If in Sweden two offenses are ordi-
narily punished by thirty- and sixty-day prison terms, imposition of a
day-fine order on the more serious offender-out of consideration for
the effects of a prison term on his family and employment-produces a
contrast between a thirty-day sentence and a sixty-unit day fine. Convert
the example to American presumptive sentences of two and four years,
and the contrast is jarring between any intermediate sanction and a
two-year sentence for someone convicted of a less serious crime.
Net widening is the third obstacle to further development of inter-
mediate sanctions. As discussed earlier, there is a natural tension be-
tween practitioners making decisions in individual cases and policy
makers trying to take a systems perspective and set policy goals for
bureaucratic organizations. In a jurisdiction that lacks well-developed
community penalties, it is understandable that judges and prosecutors
want to use newly available resources for what seem to them suitable
offenders. From the perspective of system planners, however, sentenc-
ing otherwise probation-bound offenders to a program intended for
prison-bound offenders frustrates the purpose of the program.
There are two solutions to the net-widening problem. The first is
to shift control over program placements from judges to corrections
officials wherever possible. For some programs such as boot camps and
back-end forms of ISP and house arrest, this is relatively easy and
would make it likelier that such programs would achieve their goals of
saving money and prison space without increasing recidivism rates.
Transfers of authority to corrections officials can, however, at best
be a partial solution. No one (whom we know or can imagine) wants
all sentencing authority shifted into bureaucratic hands, and judges
therefore will retain authority to decide who will be sent to jail or
prison. A little more plausible alternative would be to limit judicial
authority to the choice between prison and probation and to allow
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probation and prison authorities to decide what other sanctions (house
arrest, ISP, treatment participation, etc.) should be applied either as
probation conditions or as custodial regimes.
Few people would want to place full authority over questions of
confinement in bureaucratic hands. Judges are after all concerned with
questions of liberty and justice, and most people would probably rest
easier having judges making threshold decisions about confinement. In
addition, it is hard to imagine any role for fines and community service
in a sentencing system where judges lacked authority to order such
sentences.
The alternative is to structure judges' decisions about intermediate
sanctions by use of sentencing guidelines. A substantial body of evalua-
tion and other research demonstrates that well-conceived and imple-
mented guidelines systems can change sentencing patterns in a jurisdic-
tion and achieve high levels of judicial compliance (sometimes, as in
the federal guidelines, grudging compliance) (Tonry 1993).
Most state guidelines systems, however, establish presumptions for
who is sent to state prisons, and for how long, but do not set presump-
tions concerning nonprison sentences or choices between prison and
other sanctions. Two broad approaches for setting guidelines for non-
prison sentences have been tried (the literature is tiny: von Hirsch,
Wasik, and Green 1989; Morris and Tonry 1990).
The first, which seems to have been a dead end, is to establish
"punishment units" in which all sanctions can be expressed. Thus, a
year's confinement might equal ten units, a month of house arrest
three units, and a month's community service two units. A twenty-unit
sentence could be satisfied by any sanction or combination of sanctions
equaling twenty. This idea was taken furthest in Oregon, where sen-
tencing guidelines, in addition to setting presumptive ranges for jail
and prison sentences, specified a number of punishment units for of-
fenders not presumed bound for state prison. Oregon, however, never
set policies governing unit values, sometimes metaphorically described
as "exchange rates," and neither there nor anywhere else has the idea
been taken further.
The overwhelming problem lies in the idea of proportionality men-
tioned earlier and can be illustrated by Washington State's more mod-
est effort at exchange rates. Partial confinement and community service
were authorized as substitutes for presumptive prison terms on the
basis of one day's partial confinement or three day's community service
for one day of confinement. The partial confinement/confinement ex-
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change is probably workable (for short sentences; house arrest, assum-
ing that to count as partial confinement, is seldom imposed for more
than a few months), but the community service exchange is not.
Starting with the idea that imprisonment is more unpleasant than
community service, the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines
Commission (1993) initially decided that the exchange must be gov-
erned by an idea of comparable intrusion in the offender's life; hence,
three eight-hour days' community service per day in prison. The diffi-
culty is that community service programs to be credible must be en-
forced, and experience in this country and elsewhere instructs that
they must be short. That is why the New York program provided
seventy hours' obligation, and the Dutch, English, and Scottish pro-
grams established an upper limit of 240 hours. Under Washington's
policy, that range would permit community service in place of three
to ten days' confinement.
It is easy to criticize the Oregon commission for not carrying its
innovation further and the Washington commission for lack of imagina-
tion, but that would be unfair. Working out exchange rates in a system
predicated on strong ideas of proportionality in punishment is very
difficult, if not impossible. If punitive literalism governs, the range for
substitution between prison and community penalties is tiny. A system
like New York's community service program-which substitutes sev-
enty hours' work for six months' jail-can be justified (the idea was to
give repetitive property offenders some meaningful enforced penalty
rather than impose a jail term that no one expected would have deter-
rent effects), but it requires a loosening of proportionality constraints
that no sentencing commission has yet been prepared to accept. The
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing in 1993 gave serious consid-
eration to a punishment unit system, but abandoned it when the prob-
lem of exchange rates proved insoluble. (There are other problems
with the punishment unit approach: inevitably the exchange rates are
arbitrary; if conditions like treatment participation, drug testing, and
electronic monitoring are given unit values, comparisons between of-
fenders become even more implausible.)
The other approach is to establish different areas of a guidelines grid
in which different presumptions about choice of sentence govern. Both
North Carolina and Pennsylvania adopted such systems in 1994. One
set of crime/criminal history combinations is presumed appropriate
only for prison sentences; a second is presumed subject to a judicial
choice between prison sentences or intensive community sanctions (in-
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cluding split sentences with elements of both); a third is presumed
subject to a choice between intensive or nonintensive community sanc-
tions (or some of both); and a fourth is presumed subject only to nonin-
tensive community sanctions. A system like this was proposed by the
District of Columbia Superior Court Sentencing Commission in 1987
but never took effect. The Pennsylvania and North Carolina systems
took effect in the fall of 1994; how they will work in practice remains
to be seen.
Readers, we hope, will draw at least six conclusions from this essay.
First, for offenders who do not present unacceptable risks of violence,
well-managed intermediate sanctions offer a cost-effective way to keep
them in the community at less cost than imprisonment and with no
worse later prospect for criminality.
Second, boot camps, house arrest, and intensive supervision are
highly vulnerable to net widening when entry is controlled by judges.
For boot camps, the solution is easy: have corrections officials select
participants from among admitted prisoners. For house arrest and ISP,
the solution is less easy: corrections officials can control entry to back-
end programs, and sentencing guidelines may be able to structure
judges' decisions about admission to front-end programs.
Third, community service and monetary penalties remain woefully
underdeveloped in the United States, and much could be learned from
Europe. Day fines remain as yet a promising idea, but it has not yet
been demonstrated that they can win acceptance as penalties for non-
trivial crimes. Conditional discharges, in which convictable defendants
pay a substantial fine in exchange for conditional dismissal of charges,
like those common in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany, remain
unexplored as a potentially useful European penal import.
Fourth, front-end intermediate sanctions are unlikely to come into
widespread use as prison alternatives unless sentencing theories and
policies become more expansive and move away from oversimplified
ideas about proportionality in punishment.
Fifth, intermediate sanctions may offer promise as a way to get
and keep offenders in drug and other treatment programs. With drug
treatment programs, at least, there is evidence that coerced treatment
programs can reduce both later drug use and later crimes, and there
is evidence in the ISP and boot camp literatures that these programs
can increase treatment participation.
Sixth, there is no free lunch. The failure of most intermediate sanc-
tions to achieve promised reductions in recidivism, cost, and prison
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use were never realistic, though for the most part they were offered
in good faith. Intermediate sanctions can reduce costs and divert of-
fenders from imprisonment, but those results are not easy to obtain.
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